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I. INTRODUCTION 
Programme of the visit 
Sunday 16 January 
Morning 
13.25 
15.00 
16.45 
17.15-17.50 
18.05-18.20 
19.00 
Monday 17 Januar~ 
09.10-12.55 
Individual arrival of European Parliament Delegation 
Members in Athens. Rooms have been reserved at: 
Hotel Grande-Bretagne, 
Constitution Square, 
Athens. 
Tel: 323 02 51 Telex: 219615 
Arrival of United States Congress delegation by 
special plane at Athens Airport International 
Terminal, where they will be met by representatives 
of the European Parliament, of the Protocol Service 
of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of 
the US Embassy in Greece, and transfer by coach 
to hotel Grande-Bretagne. 
Departure from hotel Grande-Bretagne for guided 
tour of the Acropolis. 
Return to hotel Grande-Bretagne. 
Meeting of staff of the European Parliament 
Delegation: 
Conference Room, Ground Floor, 
Hotel Grande-Bretagne. 
Preparatory meeting of European Parliament 
Delegation. 
Reception given by the America-European Community 
Association CAECA> and hosted by Sir David 
NICOLSO~, MEP, Chairman of the AECA, in honour 
of the two delegations <io~i1~1i20§_QO!~> 
Mirror Room, Ground Floor, 
Hotel Grande-Bretagne. 
Conference Room, Ground Floor - Hotel Grande-
Bretagne 
Ei£~!-~Q£~iQg_~~~~iQQ_Qf_9~1~92!i2Q~ from the 
European parliament and the United States Congress. 
The draft agenda (PE 82.293> includes: 
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• 
Monday 17 January <cont'd) 
. -
14.00 
15.45-18.05 
18.40 
20.00 
20.30 
Tuesday 18 January 
09.05-12.35 
10.35 
13.00 
15.15-17.45 
19.45 
20.30 
1. Economic and monetary questions 
Crisis of the international banking system and 
problems of third-world indebtedness. 
2. Political questions 
East-West relations and their implications for 
trade. 
3. Trade questions 
Trade relations between the EC and the US in 
the aftermath of the GATT Ministerial meeting 
and the December meeting between US Cabinet 
Members and Members of the EC Commission. 
4. Miscellaneous 
Official luncheon given by Mr Ioannis HARALAMBOPOULOS, 
Foreign Minister of Greece <iDYi12!i2D-2Dil> 
D~ning Room, Ground Floor, 
Hotel Grande-Bretagne. 
§~£2DQ-~2r~iDS-~~~~i2D_2f_g~i~92!i2D~· Continuation 
of discussion of agenda items. 
Depart hotel by bus for President's Palace for 
reception given by President Constantine KARAMANLIS, 
President of the Hellenic Republic <iDYi!2!i2D-2Dil>· 
Depart Presidential Palace/Hotel Grande-Bretagne 
for: 
Dinner given on behalf of the President of the 
European Parliament in honour of the two delegations: 
Taverna Aglamer, 
Akti Koumoundourou 54-56, 
Mikrol imano. 
Tel: 411 55 11. 
Conference Room, Ground Floor - Hotel Grande-Bretagne 
!bir2-~2r~iD9-~~~~i2D_2f_Q~i~92!i2D~· Continuation 
of discussion of agenda items. 
Adjournment of session for an exchange of views with 
the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr Andreas PAPANDREOU. 
Lunch - own arrangements. 
fQ~£!b-~2r~iDS-~~~~iQD_2f_g~i~S2!i2D~· Continuation 
of discussion of agenda items. 
Departure from hotel Grande-Bretagne for: 
Dinner/buffet, with entertainment, hosted by the 
President of the Greek Parliament, Mr Ioannis ALEVRAS, 
at the 
Astir Palace Hotel, Vouliagmeni. 
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Wednesday 19 January 
10.10-11.15 
11.15-12.40 
12.40-13.40 
13.40 
Afternoon 
18.45 
20.30 
Thursday 20 January 
08.15 
09.00 
Conference Room, Ground Floor - Hotel Grande-Bretagne 
Discussions with the Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr Ioannis HARALAMBOPOULOS,and the Minister 
of National Economy, Mr Gerasimos ARSENIS. 
Press conference given by the Chairmen of delegations, 
followed by 
Informal buffet at the hotel, offered by Mrs Eva 
GREDAL, Chairman of the European Parliament Delegation. 
Free. 
Departure from hotel for reception given by 
Ambassador and Mrs STEARNS at the Ambassador's 
residence: 
18 Panaghi Kyriacou, 
Ambelokipi. 
Tel: 721 29 51-9, 721 84 01 
Return to hotel. 
US Congress delegation departs hotel Grande-Bretagne 
for Hellenikon Air Base. 
Departure of aircraft • 
• 
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II. SUMMARY OF THE WORKING SESSIONS 
Monday, 17 January 1983, 09.10-12.55 hrs 
W:>rking Sessim on Eoonani.c and MJiletary ~tions 
~S~-9~_y!~-9!!-~-S!:!2!2_9~-~-!!!~!:!one!J~2!!M!!9_2~2~~:!L~g 
E..~!~-9~_11J!!:g_tl9!:!g_!!!~22 
Mr PIQUET opened the discussion by analysing the prcblem of indebtedness 
in the context of the North-South dialogue. His particular concern was 
the plight of the world's {XX>rest countries. According to the latest Ol'XD 
calculations the total j ndebtedness of the developing countries was 626 
billion oollars. Of Uris figure sam 106 billion cbllars was owed by the 
13 developing countries of OPEX:, and 266 billion cbllars b'J the eight 
tewly lhdustrialised <l::>untries, such as Mexico and South Korea. 'Ibis left 
a figure of 254 billion cbllars owed by the remaining 134 developing 
countries,. which included the world's {XX>rest (countries with a per 
capita GNP of lower than 600 oollars per annum in 1980) • 
'Ibis latter category was of particular concern to Europe since it included 
near 1 y all of the Coomunity' s partners under the Late Co:;.1vention. '!hey 
~re also the countries where the consequences of this difficult financial 
situation were the rrost severe in human tenns: Famine and samtines 
death of the local population. 
The relatively modest proportion of the overall debt owed by these countries 
did nean, however, that a r.Un.irnum of additional help fran the advanced 
countries (possibly by paying higher prices for their exports of raw 
materials, or even a rroratorium) could be of enontalS help to a large 
ntlltber of countries. Mr PIQUET E.tressed that whereas the world's 134 
poorest countries owed 254 billion cbllars, four countries alone (Brazil, 
Mexico, South Korea and Argentina) owed 160 billion oollars • 
Another .inportant point revealed by the OEX:D figures was that the poorer 
countries were by no neans worse at paying back their loans than other 
borrowers. '!hey were,hc:JrNever, the hardest hit by the increasing cost of 
servicing debts, high interest charges and the fluctuations on the 
international noney markets where the erratic rrovem:mts of the oollar had 
been a major factor. 
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Mr PIQUET felt it should be possible for both delegations to ~mve towards 
a ccm·on approach to the world debt prcblem and to put forward sare 
possible solutions. Aroong the ideas being advocated in EurqJe -were: New 
approaches to food aid and production (including greater self-sufficiency 
and greater variety of agricultural production); raising world market 
prices of certain basic CCI111Dd.i.ties, particularly agricultural and mineral 
prcxlucts; the creation of a safety net to stabilize the earnings of certain 
countries fran particular carm:xli.ties - along the lines of the :Lc::ue 
Convention's stabex system, but on a world scale; greater resources for the 
w:>rld Bank and Internationall-t>netary F\md, with the develq>ing countries 
being far ~mre involved in the allocation of those resources; and special 
neasures to help the very poorest countries, possibly including a ~mratarium • 
Mr COLEMAN stressed tlle sheer glcbal scale of the prcblem and warned of the 
possibly disastrous consequences in both the develcping world and the 
industrialised nations of the West in the event of any major defaults. 
'!he political, social aad econanic fabric of many of the develcping countries 
could be destroyed. 'llle world econan'j could be thrown into catplete 
disarray, with ranpant protectionism and a return to isolat.ionism in 
coutries wi."!ich had been "burned". 
Although bankers tended, for crnpetitive reasons, to be sr~retive about 
figures, and statistics varied, it could be fairly accurately stated that 
\~nereas in 1971 the develcping countries owed approximately $ 87 'billion, 
~mstly to goverT~Irents of the industrialised West, by 1981 this figure had 
grown to ~mre than $ 524 billion, with the largest portion loaned by the 
Western banking carmunity. If short term loans were taken into account, 
the figure could be as high as $ 800 billion. 
'!bus tl1e two key factors -were the rapid growth of the debt during the 1970's 
and the fact that the ne\11 funds cane largely fran private CCI'IIterCial lenders 
as q>posed to govermnent or multilateral lending institutions. 
'lbe prine recipients of this new CCJ'II'Iercial lending had been the newly-
industrialised countries of the 'lhlrd World. But their high gra«h rates 
and the general go...~ health of the world econany in the early 1970's had 
not been sustained ir.to the 80's. 'lbe c.Jrrellt glcbal recession, poor 
demand for the IOC's Cnill•dity exports and extrerrely high interest rates 
charged by the CCI'IIterCial banks had not been predicted. 
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This led to a 'crisis of lending confidence' in the CClli'Cercial banks, 
who becarre increasingly unwilling to lend. As a result the International 
r-bnetary FUnd in the past two years had been called upon repeatedly to 
devise "rescue" packages for troubled LDC' s, rrost notably Mexico and 
Brazil. The IMF, both because of its o.·.n limited resources and the 
massive S<.."'ale of the developing countries' needs, had in turn af;ked the 
private international banks to participate in these bail-out schemes. 
Reluctantly, the international banks, rrost of them .Am:!rican, had cooperated, 
though this meant that they were, in effect, being 'held hostage' by the 
debtor nations. 
Although the US administration was willing in some instances to help ease 
debt pressures, as with Brazil and Mexico, it believed that these countries 
WI:'Uld have to pursue tighter econani.c policies as was the CdSe in the 
industrialised West. The Acln.i.nistration was not in favour of a generalised 
raredy of massive new transfers fran the developed countries t.o the less 
developed ones. It believed in dealing with each case individually. The 
Congress generally shared this view, particularly in view of the United 
States' domestic budget deficits. 
Sir David NICOLSON criticised pnlitical leadership in the Ccrrmunity and the 
United States for faiJing to recognise a crisis which had been a long 
time in the IMking. Since World War Two the world econany had becare 
progressive].y rrore interdependent, with an ext.raordinary increase in 
international financing. Many countries had been living beyond their 
means, and the excessive b:rrowing that had nc..-w becare evident \<tas largely 
the result of balance of pa.ynents deficit spending. 
Both the United States and the European Ccmnunity were heavily invoJved and 
it was worth noting that of the 500 billion Cbllars loaned, sare 300 billion 
was probably made up of loans fran sare 1000 private banks, many of them 
quite small. These banks were now desperately try:i.ng to extricate themselves 
fran the visible risk, making the danger much greater for the lfiO or so 
larger international banks involved. 
If bad loans had to be written off, overall lending capacity was reduced 
quite disproportionately, maybe by ten times. There was also a great deal 
of inter-bank lending. These factors could result in a multiply.:i.ng effect, 
and could set off a chain reaction. 
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So far efforts to prevent a real t inancial crisis had consisted of hec'.:ic 
improvisation of emergency credits. Now longer term solutions were 
needed. These must provide for reforms on both sides. The IMF's 
conditions for emergency credits to debtor countdes tried to ensure that 
the general econanic performance of the debtor countries was irrproved and 
growth sustained. These aims could only be achieved, however, if the 
c:reditor countries also adapted their own policies and were not over-
whelmingly preoccupied with "reconquest of dc.m:!stic markets' and "intolerable 
bilateral deficits". 
Adequate adjustrrent of the Western econanies implied massive new investnent, 
and if this was to be financed without inflation, tax and public expenditure 
policies had to be reformed to raise the agregate saving ratios of these 
economies. Also measures distorting resource allocations and constraining 
entrepma.n:ial initiative must be eliminated. This was becaning increasingly 
difficult, particularly in Europ;, and there was an uryent need for sare 
kind of common code. 
The role of the I.MF was central to any solution. Sir David welcared the 
discussions now taking place to increase IMF quota S\Jb::lcriptions and its 
GAB ( Q:meral Arrangenents to furrow). Since 1980 the use of IMF credits 
had doubled. Its outstanding loans to 33 countries new totalled 18 billion 
dollars. Its fl.lr'ther resources W\2re only about 33 billion dollars, of 
v!hich 10 billion we:-e already ccmniteJ and another 14 billion virtually 
certain to be called for. 
The IMF needed strengthening - with a lasting injection of capital and better 
management. The borrowing countries must scale down their ambitious developrent 
plans, and lenders must accept postponement of their claims, with the injection 
of further funds to kt.:.-ep the debtors alive. 
It might be necessary to offer p~riods of grace to countries in trouble, 
perhaps five years deferment of repayrrents. This ~.-.ould cause difficulties 
for both the developed and the developing countries and make the North-
South dialogue even rcore urgent and controversial. But there was no other 
alternative. 
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Europe had to play its role, alongside the United States,in seeking to 
stabilise the situation. It was vital therefore to develop a ccmron 
European Carmunity financial policy and voice. '!his could be achieved 
by further developrent of the European M::>netary System, which Britain 
should join. The El-18 should go on to provide a camon fund, with member 
countries perhaps trans~ 30% of their reserves to form it, taking 
in exchange a camon currency unit, the OCU. '!his would permit the 
establis11nent of a camon currency, and with it a proper managenent 
authority, and a system of defined joint responsibility of the central 
banks as lenders of last resort, together with a system for guaranteeing 
the Euro-dollar market. It was also necessary to agree on a canbined 
target for total money supply. 
If this could be achieved in Europe, with majority voting on econanic 
' policy in the Council of Ministers, the European <A."TTItlUllity and the United 
States would be in a better position, as the two pillars of the ~stem 
world, to cooperate fully in financial and econanic matters and offer the 
kind of partnership ~1d leadership that was expected of the world's 
two trading giants. But this depended above aJ 1 on finding the necessary 
political will to agree. 
Mr DaNKER s~ressed the enormous consequences if a major default occurred 
and it was not handled responsibily. Certainly the financial system had 
not bL~ managed responsibly during the previous 20 years. 
'!he nub of the problem was LDCs and NICs, like Yugoslavia, rorrowing 
heavily to fund an export-geared econanic plan and then failing t.o find 
markets. Everyone was trying to export. It was inportant, however, to 
resist protectionist measures. Ultimately the solution would lie in the 
revival of the world econany; but credit was a very important factor here 
.in sustaining econanic growth and it had to be soundly managed by govern-
ments and banks. 
Mr WELSH asked for the US delegation's views on proposals made by the US 
Treasury Secretary Mr Donald Regan at a meeting of the Five Westem 
Finance Ministers. His idea of setting up a new international instrurrent 
to act as a lender of last resort in the event of a r.ajor crisis caused 
by a defaulting country had aroused il1tense interest in Europe. 
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Mr PEASE said these proposals had been much bette.t rt.>ceived in Europe 
than the United States. They were one of the possible options. Mr 
PEASE went on to sLress the dangers of ignoring the economic facts of 
lifE·, although he recognised the political factors which often made this 
necessary. He gave exan.p les fran the countl ies of Eastern Eurc;p:-, where 
prices we:..e artificially held down. In Poland the price of rreat had not 
gone up in three years. These countries,and he cited particularly 
Hungary and Yugoslavia, were having to weigh the consequences of what the 
reaction would be to slower growth in wages and higher prices. 
Mr SlilM'lAY described the Regan proposal as sarething as a "trial balloon". 
It had been made at a time when Congress had other preoccupations. If 
there had been rrore time, the IMtter would have been debated rrore fully 
in the House. 
Mr ,iONES felt that any proposal along the lines indicated by Mr Reyan, 
would have a difficult time getting through Congress in the present 
climate. 
Mr SEIBERLING conceded that he was not a banker. But he pointed out that 
when the economic system failed in the 1930s it was the lawyers who had to 
'pick up the pieces.' It was his view that if we failed now to support the 
existing instrurrents to get the system out of trouble, the consequences 
could be even 91·eater than in the 1930s. Bailing out was a small price tel 
p.:ly. 
Mr BOYES said it was wrong to imply that the situation had came about alrrost 
be a<'cident. Mr Coleman in his analysis had given no causes. But in fact 
it was high interest rates attracting dollars which caused strains in 
Third countries, making it necessary for developing countries to raise 
sums that we;·e huge in proportion to their dareslic economies. The causes 
therefore - basically tight rroney ano high interest rates - were man-made 
and Pr~sident REAGAN's economic policy had to take much of the blane. 
Mr COLEMAN pointed out in reply that the alternative to tight money policies 
was world-wide hyp~r-inflation - though as legislators a number of nanbers of 
the Congress delegation probably felt that the current high interest. rates 
were perhaps too high. 
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Mr Li~ agreed with Mr PIQUm' and Sir David NICOLSON in setting the 
prd:>lem in the context of the North-South dialogue and discussions on 
a ne\v international econanic order. Much turned upon what the relation-
ship between the developed and develq>ing countries \\Ould look like in 
the future. It was necessary that the econanies of both sides should 
complement one another ~·d that the industrialised \\Orld should assist 
the poorer nations. We wanted to sell to them ~1d open up their markets 
but they needed noney to buy. It ~uld also be necessary to look to 
regearing production in the West to different types of goods, so that 
we wer.e not in direct competition. These S<Jrt of rreasures \\Ould help 
create the sort of conditions in which these p:~oblems could be solved. 
It might also be necessary to eventually consider certain loans as 
grants. The inportant thing was to set the problem in a \'o1Qrldwide 
framework - as had been done in the Brandt Commission's North-South 
Report - to enable the necessary changes to take place. 
Mr LA..~GE wanted the t\\0 delegations to go beyond analysis and to make 
concrete proposals. Fran the Europe·an side these shculd be along the 
lines already sketched out by Mr P IQUET and Sir David NICOLSON. If. these ideas 
could be put together with propc)sals fran the Arrerican delegation 
p~haps a camon positon could be reached on what could be done in the 
nedium c:nd long-tenn. Perhaps a jnint report could bE.• drawn up and 
presented at the next meeting of the t\\0 delegations. 
Mr LANTOS said plans had already been made to fonn a preparatory 
carmi ttee which \\Ould work along the lines suggested by r-1r LANGE. 
·In repl.yto Mr BOYES, he said it was not possible to sinply blarre the 
m.1ltinationals and high interest rates. The prd:>lem had been developing 
for sate time, but when it first emerged as a major phenooenon as a result 
of the oil price rises of the early 1970s, we had sinply postponed the 
·problem by recycling funds. It should be pointed out, though, that without 
recycling many countries \\OUld have gone bankrupt. Mr LANI'OS pointed out 
that the OPOC countries had been wise enough to place their noney with 
goverTli'Iel1ts or the big international banks ·· though they had subsequently 
involved the smaller less reliable banks. 
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Mr SEXiRE agreed in general with the analysis that had been made of 
the wcrld trading situation, with almost all countries striving to 
reduce their inports and increase exports. He disc:;greed hor...ever 
that the effects of r<.."Ce!;sion and contraction in world trade were 
less severe in the Communist countries than in tl~ Western democracies. 
It was sufficient to look at Poland to see that this was not so. 
Mr 'I'HG1AS wondered whether there wcmld be any ccrmor• v .Le\'t on when loans 
shou~ d be changed to grants. He asked Sir David NICOLSON if he would be 
prepared to make a specific proposal on this. 
Mr AIGNER was particularly cx:n:erurl aLout the state of the Euro-dollar 
market. A recent world Bank report had given extremely worrying figures 
about the billions of Et::ro-dollars curreutly estimated to b~ floating 
around in the world money markets. If there was no way of effectively 
controlling these funds, this phenomenen posed a major threat. He 
wondered if the American side could confinn the World Bank figures. 
Mr BLUMENFELD was also concerned about the Euro-dollar market wbich had 
emerged as a major problem in the· wake of the recycling. He wondered whether any 
international instrurrent or machinery would be capable of controlling this 
market? 
He agreed with E~arlier speakers that one of the reasons Third countries 
could not repay their debts was because e .. ·eryone was trying t6 cut back on 
.inp:>rts. And this, respite the fact that we had given so maJ"'.y credits 
to help export capital eq..1iprrent to Third countries. 
He shared Sir David NitOLSON's view that a political decjsion was needed. 
The United States and Europe should work together on this . A working. 
party ccnposec1 of rrembers of the two delegations could be of help hen,. 
Mr LANGE wanted to make clear that he was not proposing that debts be 
written off. What he had said was that we might b~ for'Ced to this. His 
aim was to prevent this caning about. He~ added that the situation had not 
been helped by attaching political strings to developnent aid. It was 
sufficient to note that virtually no progress had been made in the battle 
against world hunger. He also observed that the orientation of many 
developnent aid programres had been wrong. 
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~.E_£.CKLE said that a p.:rrt cf the solution w~s putting our aNn hcuse in 
order. We all needed to learn to live within our CMI.". darestic budgets. 
He pointed out that Social Security payments were now a huge element in 
those budgets - in the case of the United States they am:::>unted to about 
a quarter of the l''edcral budget. 
Mr WEL:)H felt the dangers now being faced by the world banking system 
were probably a more serious problem than threats to the world's open 
trading system. In searching for remedies,however,it was necessary 
to move on fran general analysis towards making specific proposals. 
Mr GAtrriER cane back to the European di.rrension and the develqxrent of 
the EMS. He pointed out that extnnely slow progress, if any, was 
being made in coordinating the econauic policies of Ccmnunity rcember 
states. Europe was not yet united enough to create the instrUIYents 
that would be needed to help solve the problem - for instance a 
European bank funded by transfers fran other central banks. He also 
felt then, was a degree of hypJCr.isy in staterrents about keeping world 
markets open aud willingness to pily higher prkcs for cc·rtain products. 
Mr PEASE hoped it would not be necessary to convert loans to grants. This would 
send a wrong signal to certain countries. He felt that much opinion within 
Congress and the Administration was against bailing out the banks - there was 
a feeling that they had brought these difficulties on themselves. He 
suggested thctt there was even a tenptation to permit a little defaulting 
to occur in order to teach the balksa lesson. On the quesb.on cf exports 
fran Tnird countries, he pointed out that this posed a dilernna for Congressrren 
since increased inports often rreant jobs being lost ct hare. In this 
connection ~.r Pease referred to the Caribbean Basin Initiative. This sort 
of scllerrt:! could only go forward in tandem with workers' retraining 
programmes in the United States. 
Mr GIBSJNS said it Wl-ls also a question of Third countries putting their 
houses in order. He gave ~ico as an example. Perhaps we were spending 
too much tirre blaming ourselves for the crisis. Perhaps we were too 
prepared to prop up poor management in Third countries and the banks. It 
might be that in the end a few banks might have to fail. 
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Mr AIGNER returned to his earlier question on the effect of the Euro-
oollar market. He also pointed out that a lot of electors in the 
industrialised nations were beginning to question support for developing 
countries whose defence expenditure was in ex cess of their debt. He 
also refe::. reel to the huge loans which had been made to Warsaw Pact 
coun1.ries. 
Mr BOYES care ta::k to his earlier point about the causes of the problem. 
It was not possible to blame it all on the energy crisis and other 
unexpected factors. The situation was man-made. 
Mr LANroS said he also believed in causality, net accidents . B.Jt. re 
resented the views of sane of the Euro left and the LOC' s thc!t the 
USA was the Great Devil behind it all. The United States just could 
not accept th]s. It was a fact that the United States was very pre-
ccctipied with its own econanic darestic concerns. But one of the 
reasons Wl.1y the United States wus not so syrrpatbetic to the problerrs 
of the LOC s' was that they were so o;,·ertly anti-Arrerican. In this 
connection he cited the 'I.Ork of Mrs J;irkpatrick at the United Nations 
in standing up for· the United States. 
Mrs VEIL felt that it w,•.s necessary to recognise that when the United 
State.5 and Europe tried to help lame ducks, they were acting out of 
self-interest, in order to keep their clients and their markets. We 
had to oo what was necessary to p:revent bankruptcies occurring. 
Political and econanic judgercents were very much intertwined in 
examining the international debt problem . One of the political 
aspects that needed to be brought out was that both Europe and the 
United States wanted to see derroc rat.ic values preserved and enhanced. 
Both of our sucieties ehm:rl the same derrocratic ideals and aspil"at:i ons 
and we should be ready to stand together to defend them. Perhaps there 
was too fr~~ntly a tendency in Europe to accuse the United States. 
Certainly we were not all rrembers of the same society . But we were 
closely linked by our econanic and political interests. 
One factor that could help Europe act m)re in concert with the United 
States would be a st:J:el3tha1.1nj of the European Monetary System. At 
present there was no European currency to match the international 
role of the dollar. If Europe could work towards this it would help 
to prarote greater international stability. 
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Mr SEIBERL:nli camented on the huge size of defence budgets and the large 
pool of talented and trained manpower arployed in the defence sector. 
'!his r<.:apresented an inportc:•nt diversion of capital and labour and sare 
thought should be given to reducing d:fence spending. 
~!~-~QB§~Y said that a variety of policies had been tried out but had failed 
to produce results. The dangers of a collapse in the international banking 
system were considerable. And it seemed that !governments were not capable 
of putting the brakes on. It was therefore necessary to establish responsibilities 
for managing the crisis and to act together in a concerted fashion together 
with the IMF. It was also necessary to explain to our electors why we were 
taking certain measures. If we did not take appropriate measures,the situation 
would simply get worse and relations between the industri~ countries and 
the developing countries would became even more ~ It was also important 
not to let the current banking and financial crisis blind us to the difficulties 
faced in certain parts of the world. We could help to achieve progress in other 
parts of the world. We should therefore look towaods agreeing a common EC-US 
stand on development policy. There was a very real prospect that in five years 
time the debt problem would be even greater and poor countries' prospects of 
development smaller. This should be kept very much in mind as the Community 
bega1 negotiations for renewal of the Lome Convention. 
~!~-I~Q~~~ asked Mr. BOYES what specific propo&llshe would make to solve the 
world d!bt problem. 
~!~-~BQ~ said the whole situation pointed to the need for fundamental industrial 
restrudORingat home. European nations were running deficits and our budgets could 
no longer meet the commitments we had undertaken. At one time free trade had 
served us all well. But now there were increasing protectionist pressure everywhere 
- even from the entrepreneurs. This na:E tlri.rg5 diffioll.t fer t:te ~ w::rld. 
~rmerly we had encouraged the developing countries to industrialize - now we 
were keeping their exports out. It should also be oointed out, though, that not 
all the blame could be placed on the banking system - the oligarchies at the 
head of many developing countries also had some responsability to bear. 
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Mr SlitM'lAY asserted that for his governrrent the econanic 1 ecovcry of 
the United States was the top priority. There wi:!s a P!aBsivE:.• ck .. ficit in 
the budget which had to be brougl1t :into balance. But there could be no 
n_~overy in the United S~ate;.; without econanic health in Europe. Intrense 
efforts \\ere being made in the United States <Chid there had to be sarc 
W1derstanding for the difficulties faced by Arccdca. It \'las a hard thing 
to say, but the United State~' could not continue for ever to bail nut 
other nations. The United States was not a bottanlcss p.it. 
Mr GAUTIER spoke of the difficulties of rt:.>conciling our political 
beliefs about wi·..at should be done on the international scene with pressures 
fran . constituents. It was vital to ~lain matters frankly to the 
electorate. 
Sir David NICOLS<..'N reaffimed his earlier conclusion that what was needed 
above all was the political will to find solutions. 
MI::.~OLEM~ hnped that ,•ft(·r taking a broad inte1national rer5pective at 
such mc~ting a~ this, delegate:• did not behave in a parochial way when 
the debt. proolem caused a crisis at hare. The Cong1essional delegation 
~uld go bad to the UnitEd States Administration requesting further 
clarification of the United States p)s)tion and policies and stressing 
that tine WdS rur.ning short. 
Mt" PIQUET reaffi.nred his concetn for the pc>.:)rest countries. It; was 
necessary to think in terms of a IOC·ratoriurn for these coW1tries. We also 
needed to develop a better st.rategy on food aid and to reach the o. 7% 
target set by the Ui.1ited Nations for developrent spending. It was 
important not to put all the debtor countries in one basket - there we~e 
different kinds of indebtectcwent. H•7 hcped that when the joint camri.ttee 
gGt to work, perhaps taking ~ a r•umber of Sil'" David Nicolson's ideas, 
that the debt problem would be seen very much in the cont~·xt of the 
North-South diaJogue. 
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Monday, 17 January 1983,15.45-18.05 hrs 
Tuesday, 18 January i983, 09.05-09.30 hrs 
Working Session on Political questions 
Mr MOREAU introduced the discussion by indicating same of the major issues 
over which the COmmunity and the United States had d~sagreed Oliring 1982 -
making it a year of very great misunderstanding between the two Atlantic 
partners. The two sides had been at odds over the Soviet gas pipeline, 
security policy in Europe, and the GAT!' talks; on foreign policy they 
differed in their perceptions of the situation in the Middle East, and central 
Arrerica, as well as Poland and Afghanistan. 
Differences of view on these issues had been exacerbated by continuing 
discord over trade policies, most notably perhaps over the question of 
export credits and subsidies. 
This was happening during a period when all nations ~re having to reappraise 
carefully their own particular economic situation and to address themselves 
to the problem of major economic restructuring. In these circumstances it 
was easy to be terrpted to return to protectionism and isolationism. The 
great danger, however, was that we might all find ourselves driven to take 
protectionist measures without really wanting to do so. 
It was vital therefore to try to reconcile differences over economic 
policies and to work towards a carmen view on East-West trade. Each 
side had to be prepared to take far greater account of the other's 
views and to engage in consultation. 
The classic example of failure to do this had been the American imposition 
of sanctions to prevent deliveries for the construction of the Soviet gas-
pipeline: There had been no hint of this at the Versailles Sumnit; the 
sanctions were based on false presumptions about the extra territorial 
jurisdiction of Arrerican laws; they were iroposed with retroactive effect; 
and they were a highly inappropriate measure since they affected 
production and employment in Europe, which was suffering the same economic 
strains as the United States. 
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While it was true that there was not always a single European view-
point on major issues, it was possible to have an effective trans-
Atlantic dialogue. 'I'his should be the aim for 1983, particularly 
with regard to that issue still very much on the agenda - the 
question of disarmarrent and security in Europe. 
Mr PFASE agreed that 1982 had been one of the nost turbulent years 
in the history of the Atlantic Community. Tension developed because 
of the unresolved deployrrent of INF weapons, the controversy about 
burden sharing, the ccrrrron dilemna of stagnant e;xn::rmes Wri.ch b:e:rl prcta::tiarisn arl 
the pipeline dispute. At the heart of the latter disagreement were 
differences over the course of East-west relations and the role of 
trade within that relationship. 
But there was now an opportunity to shape a ccrrrron policy on East-West 
trade. Secretary of State George SCHULT~was making efforts to 
devise a better strategy on trade with the Soviet Union and was trying 
to eliminate the confusion in Ancrkan policy. 
In recent week~; the United States and its allies had noved toward 
agreement to study and devise a policy to prevent Western trade 
fran strengthening Soviet military capability. In Paris, six areas to be 
discussed were outlined by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson: 
- The member countries will negotiate on the possibility of expanding 
the activities of Cocan and accelerating its decision-making: 
- Members of Cocan will examine the question of whether oil and gas 
technology directly strengthen Soviet military capability: 
- The OEX:D countries will pursue a study, originally called for at 
last year's Versailles summit, to nonitor the flow of credit and 
trade to the Soviet Union: 
- These same nations will undertake a study of energy alternatives 
to lessen the charu:es of increa~;ed dependency on Soviet natural gas: 
- The OECD members will also examine ways to prevent the Soviet Union 
from receiving subsidies and preferential treatment from the West: 
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- 1\nd, Lina.lly, the rrcrnbcrs of NA'IO will ~rk to improve consultations 
and coordination of policy. 
However, reaching agreerrent on these points ~uld demand much understanding 
and ~rk. United States and Europe continued to have different concepts 
of the role of trade in East-West relations. Because of geography and 
history Europeans had different views of the Soviet Union and detente. 
Unlike the Arrericans, they never rcrceived detente primarily in military 
tenns. For Europeans detente also offered expanded ccmrercial, poLitical 
and even personal ties. ~heir experience had taught them that economic 
sanctions could not have much impact on Soviet behaviour in Poland or 
Afghanistan. And many European observers believed that an econanicall y 
troubled Soviet Union might be more unpredictable and aggressive than 
a stable one. 
Mr PEASE felt that particular attention should be paid to Cocan, the 
coord1nating committee which seeks to re<Julate the flow of military 
related technology to the Soviet Union. Because of its access to 
Western technology the Soviet Union hjd made inportant gains in 
crnputer and micro electronic technology as well as designs for both 
strategic a;ct tactical aircraft. At prcf'..ent, Cocan fOC'.mbers had little:> 
disagrecn-cnt .:IDout halting the fl<M of technology d_i_r~_t_~y related to the 
military, but the Western powers differed over the issue of indirectly 
- ~ .... ·-- -
related technology. Mr PEASE felt it was inportant to obtain agreerrent 
on greater restrictions if the West wished to slow the rate of Soviet 
technological growth in the military sphere. 
In this area, as in all others relating to East-West trade, the answer 
was to irrprove consultation and cooperation across the Atlantic. If, for 
instance, there had been better cons'.lltation on energy alternatives in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's, the pipeline controversy might not have 
arisen. 
A number of studies, some initiated by Secretary of State Schultz, are 
now being undertaken on all of these matters. But if a new concerted 
policy on East-West trade was to emerge it was necessary that concrete 
proposals and action should eventually result from these studies. 
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M!". ~~~!!!, stressed the way in which areas of disagrcerrcnt spilled over 
into one another~ Differences over trade and foreign policy affected 
discussion on security and arms control. There were divergent views on the planned 
deployment in Europe this year of INF we~ns and it remained to be 
seen what might errerge when the INF talks resurred in Geneva. Mr 
HAAGERUP pointed out that when President REAGAN first proposed his 
"zero option" in November 1981, the rrove was generally welcared in 
Europe. However the zero option had not rerroved opposition in Europe to 
the deployment of Pershing II and ground launched Cruise missiles. Atthe same 
time it should be noted that, Europeans in general ruled out Soviet proposals 
that British and French interrrediate range missiles should also figure in 
any tr~de off_against the Soviet SS 20 missile. 
Mr HMGERUP suggested that it would not be possible for the American 
Administration to maintain indefinitely its all-or-nothing approach 
to the INF ·deployment question. Now might be the rrarent to start looking 
for a rrore limited first-phase agreement on this issue. The visit to 
Europe at the end of the rronth by US Vice-President BUSH, might help ill 
working towards a rrore flexible negotiating position. 
With regard to the controversial dismissal of Mr Eugene Rostaw as head of 
the United States' Arms Control and Disaill'\al'Tent Agency, Mr IIMGF!RUP was 
convinced that this did not mean a major shift in US policy to a 
rrore hardline approach, Crtf nore than the replacerrent of G:.meral IIAIG by 
Mr Schultz had rrea1t any significant change in the direction of US foreign 
policy. 
In conclusion Mr HAAGERUP referred to his own report on European P~litical 
Cooperation and European Security which had been adopted by ill fer, 50 ap:inst a-rl19 
aostentions by the European Parliament the previous week. It was 
significant that the report which took a clear pro-Atlantic position had 
found supporters in all of the six major political groups in the European 
Parliament. Point 5 of the resolution had urged that a more effective 
coordination take place between the consultations in EPC and the Atlantic 
Council when political and economic subjects touching on matters related 
to peace and European security were under discussion. 
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-Mr ~addressed himself specifically to the question of the use 
of sanctions by the .Anerican Adninistration to achieve sare of its 
human rights and foreign policy oojectives. Such policies, he pointed out, 
were undoubtedly controversial - within COngress, within the 
Adninistration, and within the business cannunity. The United States, 
for instance, had banned sales of anns to Libya, which had been identified 
as a terrorist nation; this had meant the loss of a major B~ing contract and 
conse--quent . effect on joos. On the whole, the American business camnmity 
was against the use of trade sanctions. But they did recognise that 
limits must be set in turning over high technology to the Soviet Union. 
It was difficult to get the balance right and such policies were difficult 
to acln:i.nister. Nor was it easy to explain to American interest groups 
the value of such policies. For instance, in the case of the grain 
ertbargo inp::>sed by the United States, other nations had been prepared to 
sell to the Soviets and Arrerican famers had s.iJTply lost a market. 
Nonetheless it seemed that we would always came back to the possibility 
of imposing sanctions in seeking to achieve certain foreign policy 
objectives. As a result, however, of the experience of the past two 
years, the United States would probably be reluctant to go it alone in 
the future. If the Americans wanted to adopt get-tough policies with 
the Soviets they would try to cb so in concert with the Eurcpeans. 
'Lord BEmELL felt that an :inportant new factor in East-West relations 
---- ·--
could be the change in the Soviet leadership. This might p.covide new 
opportunities since Soviet policy sameti.nes took new directions when 
the party secretary-General was replaced. Certainly in the period 
lead: ng up to Mr Brezhnev' s death there had been evidence: of a degree 
paralysis in Soviet policy making; this could for instance explain the 
reasons for Soviet inactivity in the Lebanon. 
It was ~rtant that in East-west relations human rights issues were 
not glassed over. 'n1e human rights provisions had been an ~rtant 
part of the Helsinki Final Act. Human rights ;was· not sinply a nora! 
issue, it was political as well. Academician Sakarov had stated that 
our aUil should be to make human rights a political prd:>lem for the 
violatir..g country. So we sOOuld not ignore develqnents · l.:iJe 1::1'2 drcEtic J:Edttjm .in tre 
nmi:ler of Soviet jews ~ have been allowed to emigrate in 1982 as carpared 
'·.\with 1980. It was a duty to our ccnstituents and .,oor response to political 
{U!SSm:s : to keep such issues at the forefroot of East-west discussions and 
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to keep raising these matters at western summit meetings, alongside such issues 
as trade and anns control. 
Lord BE'lliELL had therefore been plcaHC<l to llC'ar lhnt the 1\rl'cr icun crlcqat ion, 
on their tour of several East bloc countries en route to Athens,had, while 
in the Soviet Union, made a (X>int of meeting certain refusEniks and Mrs 
Elena Bonner. 
In conclusion, Lord BE'IHELL echoed previous speakers in calling for closer 
consultation and preparation amongst western nations so that they could act 
together when crises arose. It had too often been the case that the West 
was caught reacting to events in same discrrray, rather than anticipating 
events. The West \<as still a long way fran developing a coherent strategy 
towards Eastern Europe and abandoning tendencies to act unilaterally (as had 
been the case over the US grain embargo and the·pipeline). 
Mr AIGNER alluded to the difficulties the Community sometimes had in 
spcnk i ng with one voice on foreign (X>licy issues. European political 
cooperation only existed because the Camon Market had been created and it ctpntrl 
on Ernxpe's strength as an econanic power; But political cooperation was still 
at an early stage of developrent and there was no carm:m (X>Sition on many 
major issues. Europe still very much needed the protective influence of 
the United States. In many respects, Mr AIGNER said,.he shared Arrerican 
views about the Soviets. He had, for instance, been against construction 
of the pipeline. Problems had arisen over this issue because the United 
States had begun to exert pressure once both sides had t.aken a position. 
And Europe was in a different (X>Sition fran the United States vis-a-vis 
the USSR - Europe was nruch m:>re dependent on exports to the USSR than was 
the United States. The Arrericans also failed to appreciate that it was not 
easy for the Community to coordinate its position and follow the United 
States on something like an embargo; the Community had not really 
developed sufficiently its instrunents for coordinating policy at this 
level. 
With regard to the appointment of Mr ANDROPOV as Mr BREZHNEV's successor, 
Mr AIGNER recognised that the new Soviet leader was an intelligent man 
who might be cpm to discussion, but it should not be forgotten that he was 
also a hard man, who had been the Soviet Union's anbassador to Budapest 
during the repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and that until 
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May 1982 he had been head of the Carmi.ttee for State Security (KGB) 
which it now appeared w.'J.S behind the plot to assa9sinate the Pope. 
~- ~~~~ stressed the significance of the pipeline affair as a lesson 
in how the West should not solve crises. A greater transatlantic flow 
of information was necessary and a greater appreciation of each other's 
respective positions. The United States, for instance, should realise 
that in much of Europe trade with the Soviet Union did not have a 
political d.i.rrension. In a sense the Helsinki Final Act had recognised 
that fact. The Final Act concerned not just questions of hmnan rights 
but also questions of trade relations. In this connection he recalled 
the European Parliarrent' s recent rPsolution on relations between the 
~1ropean Community and the East European State-trading countries and 
the Q.1FA (CG1EX:ON). This recognised the reality and the necessity of 
trade relations between both parts of Europe, without ignoring the 
political dimension. It was also important not to forget the Community's 
preferential trade links with Yugoslavia and the special relationship 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Dem:x::ratic 
Republic. 
Mr BLUMENFELD suggested that it was now time to put the pipeline problem 
behind us. That issue was his1.ory. The question now was whether \Ve could 
influence Soviet policy and strategy. The ans\Ver tD this q.ESt.i.cn vas ro. ~ hD ra.er 
been able to. Sanctions in g:reral liD ro effe::.t. F.xperience since W(.•rld 
War II had shown that alnost without exception san::tims l'E\.Cr' w:x:Ke:i. In this 
connection Mr BLur~D cited the European Parliarrent' s report on sanctions 
drawn up by Mr SEELER on r..ehc:tlf of the Cammib:.ee on External Econanic 
Relations. 
We therefore had to ask ourselves again the question \Ve had been asking 
at EP-congress meetings and NATO ~semt~ly meetings for the previous 15 
years: What, if anything, could influence the Soviets? 
The anS\Ver might. lie with COCCM if \Ve could agree 0:1 its application a:-.d 
if \Ve had the political will to do so. There might also be Ecope for 
developing a common strategy on credits and interest rates to the East 
bloc - up to now d1e ~Jest had bem too generous. 
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'l'hc guropcan Par liarrcnt and the US co~ .gress could perhaps put their 
heads together on this watte1 with a view to adoption in both houses 
of a joint resolution; that might b:> one way of making an irrpression 
on our own governments ~,d certainly on the Soviet Government. 
Mr GIBOONS said he shared Mr BLUM"i!NFELD' s views and agreed with his 
proposal. It might also be worth looking at what could be done through 
the GAT!' rrechanism. At all events the question of a joint approach 
should be kept ve1y much on our agenda. 
Mr LANGE said that transatlc:•ntic conflicts had continued to arise over 
the years for the same basic reason: Europe could not accept that the 
United States should assume primacy in the Atlantic Alliance forever. 
We had to treat one another as equal partners. The United States must 
consult rcore and dictate less. It was no good just carplaining about 
each others' actions - certain political realities had to be recognised: 
For instance wany Enropean countries did not have their own energy 
resources; and with regard to Afghanistan it had to be recognised that 
this country had long fjgured in Soviet plans. 
Mr WELSH pointed out that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was one 
-------
of the last great consumption areas where the West could hope to sell 
its goods. The aim should be to open their markets up. Credit should 
be used to boost sales of Arrerican and European consumer goods. It 
was clear that the old tarter system of trade was no good but there might 
be a possibility of working out a trading code within the OEX:D. He agreed 
with other speakers that sanctions had little if any effect, except 
possibly to satisfy public opinion. 
~- .~0..~ said that in general he took thto> same view on sanctions. At the 
same time it should not be forgotten that we often showed ex~essive 
generosity to the Eastern bloc: Saretimes the East European countries 
were able to obtain better terms of credit than the developing countries. 
epinions varied in Europe as to how to approach the East. And there was 
the (iaoteu1 of carpanies trying to outdo one another as they carpeted 
for business in Eastern Europe. 
He also concurred with other speakers in stressing the irrportance of :OC·-
US consultation and preparation rather than reaction after the event. 
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Mr SEX:iRE was also against the use of sanctions. He too n. .>Called that 
they invariably never worked and harked back to the case of Italy's pre war 
invasion of Abyssinia a:-.d the sanctions inposed by the league of Nations. 
His main concern h<:Mevcr, \<rith regard to transatlantic relations was that 
they were failing to m.mage a'1d concl·~rt policy to c~al with econank crise: .. 
This was simply not bcjng done. 
Mrs VEIL did net wish to be too clismissi ve of the value of sanctions. 
The European Parliament had on occasion called for the. imposition of 
sanctions. Certainly we should not have any illusions about the effect 
they might have, but nor should we overlook the fact that they often 
had a moral and political value. 
Ml: RIPA DI MEANA shared Mrs VEIL's v.!ew about the moral effect of 
sanctions. 
we had to came to terms with the situation as it was in the wake of the 
Helsinki Final Act and to recognise that conditions in the East have 
changed considerably since the harsh econanic ti.Jres of the e.:rrly years 
of Communist experiment. There was a theory, ~ven subscribed to by financiers 
and diplanats, that the one way of influe11cing the East was by increased trade 
and by changing conslllrer habits in Eastern Europe. There were also the 
Sonnenfeldt theories, these too supported by dlplanats, although these 
seened to be somewhat in decline. 
Mr BaNKER (reopening the debate on Tuesday morning) gave a brief s~y 
of the main points made by speakers the prevjous afternoon. 
~.E.~~ in ~'king to draw conclusions from the discussion, focussed on 
the question of sanctions. Clearly both sides were free to take unilateral 
action if they wished, Put tl~ pipeline issue had shown how important it was to 
formulate common policies on the application of sanctions. In general, 
tle conclusion Sf '€!~'red to be that sanctions did not work. But there was 
also a ft.>eling that sanctions concerning military equiprent could be 
effective - it should perhaps be possible to ccordinate policy in this 
area within N..~ro. It was all very well, however, to say that we had to 
act together, but then still find o:,r1:3elves reacting differently next 
time a crisis arose. It 'M:'Uld be important therefore to try to establish 
same g.round rules for imposing sanctions and to agree not to impose 
sanctions without consulting one another. 
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Tuesday, 18 January 1983 
Mr !~Q~~§ outlined some of the relevant issues in internat iun.1L 
29£i£~!!~£2!_!£2Q~ and warned that there was a risk of a trade war in this 
sector, unless the US and the EC were more successful in defending the free 
trade system. 
American farmers were fundamentally in favour of free trade in agricultural 
produce and fair conditions of competition on foreign markets. They also wanted 
to see a more powerful GATT and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and 
of subsidies. 
The question of subsidies was at the centre of the current EC/US negotiations. 
The US was not aiming at the abolition of the CAP, but wished to eliminate state-
aided surplus production, which, through further subsidies, found its way onto 
the world market and created distortions of competition, which were working to 
the increasing disadvantage of American farmers. 
American farmers were urging the government to act quickly to eliminate 
such disadvantages. If that could not be achieved with the EC at the 
negotiating table, the US Government would soon be compelled to take retaliatory 
action in the form of export subsidies. It was therefore imperative for the 
European Parliament and the American Congress to exert increased pressure on 
their respective governments to resist protectionism and preserve free trade. 
Mr §~~!!EB observed that a restatement by the EC or the US of the 
recriminations surrounding agricultural trade was not conducive to future 
discussions. Solutions could be reached only in serious, depoliticized talks, 
in which the situation for each individual product would have to be considered 
separately. Individual solutions would have to be harmonized in corresponding 
programmes, but these could not be allowed to undermine the common agricultural 
policy. 
Mr g~_!2_§~8~~ emphasized that in this question both the American and the 
European sides had to reconcile their general political interests with the 
wishes of their respective electorates. However, following political pressure 
from the farmers, practical results in the effort to resolve the agricultural 
trade disputes would soon have to be announced. 
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Mr £Qbt~B~ said that, in the past, Am~rican agricultural productiorl 
had been geared to the needs of the market, while that of the EC had been 
dictated by the current guide prices. This was the cause of the present 
problems of overproduction and distortions of competitio~, to which solutions, 
were urgently required. 
Mr §!~§Q~~ observed that the problems mentioned had been discussed in 
the same way by the two delegations for many years, and no solutions had been 
reached. Attempts should be made to devise rules within the framework of GATT 
in order rapidly to eliminate the recurrent trade crises. 
Mr ~!§~;~ agreed that the present problems were not new, but solutions 
could only be found in cooperation and not in conflict. He saw the EC's 
planned co-responsibility levy as one possibility for eliminating surplus 
production. Direct price reductions would not necessarily lead to a fall 
in production, but would instead result in a shift from small- to large-scale 
production. In general, both the us and the EC should show more understanding 
for each other's problems. 
Mr ~;b~tl said that the European Parliament's attitude towards the shaping 
of agricultural policy was not entirely consistent. Nevertheless, it was 
possible to find solutions to surplus production, as the EC had proved with its 
special product agreements, for instance with New Zealand. 
Mr §~~!!;~ called for separate solutions for individual products and a 
strict observance of the GATT rules, since otherwise the present crisis would 
be exacerbated. 
Mr tl~£~~~Y stresed that there was only a short time left for reaching 
solutions. American farmers wished to see progress on the outstanding 
agricultural trade questions in the course of this year. 
Mrs §~~Q~b adjourned the meeting at 10.30 a.m. 
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Tuesday, 18 January 1983, 3.15- 5.45 p.m. 
Mr E8~~~~~ summarized the different positions of the US and the EC at the 
§~II-~iOii!~ti!!_m~~!i09 of November 1982 and outlined the main issues discussed 
there. These included the struggle against etQ!~£!i20i§m: the commitments made 
at the meeting in this connection would have to stand the test of trading 
realities. 
With regard to the §~!~g~~!Q_£1~~~~, some progress was made, although not 
enough to satisfy the US. The central problem of selectivity remained unresolved, 
since the US and the majority of the participating countries rejected selectivity 
as advocated by the EC. A possible compromise formula involving the application 
of selectivity in the context of the consent procedure was rejected by the EC 
and the developing countries alike. 
Measures were agreed to accelerate the procedure for the §~!!1~m~Q!_Q! 
9i§e~!~§ and to give a more active role to the GATT Secretariat. The discussions 
on !9ti£~1!~r~ predictably occupied a central place at the meeting. Although the 
EC, in opposition to all the other countries, blocked progress in the elimination 
of subsidies and unfair trading practices, the decision to set up a committee on 
agricultural trade could in the final analysis be regarded as a success for the 
US. This committee would thoroughly examine all unresolved questions. 
With regard to the §~t~if~§_§~f!Q£, the Community supported the US in its 
call for studies on the possible incorporation of this sector into GATT. 
Opposition to this proposal came mainly from a number of developing countries, 
which we~e worried about an increase in obligations in this rapidly expanding 
sector. 
Questions of 2Q~20f~Q_!~£b02129~ were not included in the final declaration 
of the ministerial meeting, but it could safely be assumed that they would be 
discussed at a future meeting of the GATT Council. 
In conclusion it was observed that the results of the GATT Ministerial 
meeting were very modest, given the existing world economic problems. Despite 
the increased protectionist pressures, free trade could not be considered as a 
lost cause in the US. However, GATT was now the object of a tug of war, and 
immense efforts from its contracting parties would be required, if it was to be 
saved. 
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Mr ~~b~tl said it was worth looking back to the last occasion when the 
two delegations had met. At that meeting the main issues had been: steel, 
the pipeline and trade with Eastern Europe, trade with Japan, the problems 
of the NICs, transatlantic communications and consultations. 
The steel is~ue had been successfully resolved - although perhaps only 
' 
temporarily. At all events, it was off the agenda for the present. Germany 
had been very helpful in bringing about a solution. 
The pipeline row had been defused. So both the United States and the 
Community were now in a position to review their stands on East-West trade 
in general. 
With regard to Japan, it was to be noted that the Japanese had come away 
almost unscathed from the GATT conference. It might be time therefore for 
Europe and the United States to take another hard look at Japan's trading 
practices. 
The question of the NICs and their indebtedness were still very much on 
the agenda. 
Communications and consultations across the Atlantic had improved. The 
work of Secretary of State SCHULTZ had been very important in this regard. 
So the success rate was two and a half out of five which could not be 
considered too bad. 
Turning to the GATT Ministerial meeting, Mr WELSH said it was necessary 
to put the record straight on certain points. It had, for instance, been 
• stated that there had been insufficient preparation for the meeting. This 
was nonsense. It had also been stated that the Community had blocked progress 
at every turn. This was not true either: The Community was prepared to 
negotiate and talk seriously on certain issues, just as soon as other countries 
were. 
At the end of the GATT meeting, from a European point of view, there had 
been satisfaction that the Community had held together and covered its main 
positions, and that the GATT remained intact. 
- 37 - PE 83.220 
It was open to question, however, for how long GATT would remain intact. 
Mr WELSH said Europe had been shocked by recent protectionist moves in the 
United States. It was all very well to accuse the Community. But it had to 
be pointed out that the United States also had a protected agricultural 
system. And just how easy was it to sell textiles to the United States? It 
was worth noting also that the Community ran a trade deficit with both the 
United States and Japan. 
Then there were the various 'Buy American' campa1gns and the Domestic 
Content Bill, which was a very hypocritical measure. There was also the 
prospect of reciprocity legislation, which, Mr WELSH pointed out, simply 
would not work. There was no such thing as 'fair trade' - except in theory. 
In conclusion, Mr WELSH said, the important thing was not to give in to 
the short term demands of electors. The duty of elected representatives was 
to lead, not follow, public opinion. And it should not be forgotten that the 
effect of protectionism was to deny people the right to choose. 
Mr §!~~~~BB~ summarized the discussion relating more specifically to 
agriculture. He picked out many signs of the aggressive American attitude, 
an attitude which aimed to lay all the problems of American agriculture at 
the door of the common agricultural policy. Mr §!~~~~BB~ declared that the 
United States were endeavouring, under a cloak of liberalism, to establ.ish 
the supremacy of the stronger producers. He also emphasized certain aspects 
which could help to defuse some of the existing problems. 
Firstly, he stressed the great structural differences between European 
and American agriculture and the immense difference in the size of farms on 
the two continents. He denied that the CAP was a static policy, since the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council had all tried to adapt it 
to the various market situations. He drew attention to measures such as the co-
responsibility levy, production quotas, the reduction in the guarantee. Moreover, 
the structures sector had in recent years seen a reduction of approximately 
300,000 hectares a year as a result of the implementation of the Community's 
structural policy. 
He then pointed out that agricultural income had fallen by about 12X in 
real terms since 1978. Another argument put forward by the Americans was the 
cost of the CAP: it was difficult to compare this with US expenditure, since, 
in addition to federal outlay, direct or indirect expenditure by the individual 
states would have to be considered. The ratio of budget expenditure to the 
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added value of agricultural production in the period from 1976 to 1978 was 
39.2~ in the case of the EC and 37.2~ for the US. This proved that the 
support given was on the same scale. 
Mr §!~~~aBBa made some observations on the American agricultural system. 
He explained that the 1982 Farm Bill retained the target price and included a 
programme for the dairy sector and a sugar support programme. Moreover, 
provision was made for import subsidies, aid for the marketing of agricultural 
produce, guarantees and insurance on import credits, large-scale food aid 
programmes and bilateral compensation agreements. All these measures showed 
that American agriculture could just as legitimately be regarded as an 
assisted sector as European agriculture. 
He believed that attempts were being made to blame the common agricultural 
policy for the difficulties currently facing American farmers. However, these 
difficulties stemmed from two series of factors: 
from external factors, since there was greater competition within the agri-
foodstuffs sector, due in part to the fact that the United States - as a 
result of political decisions such as the embargo- had lost credibility as 
a reliable supplier of agricultural products. Even Mr de la GARZA, the 
chairman of the Congressional Committee on Agriculture, had already expressed 
this opinion; 
- from internal factors, which applied equally to European farmers: the 
increase in production costs, interest rates, the world economic situation, 
all these, together with the high exchange rate for the dollar, had resulted 
in a decline in American exports • 
In conclusion, Mr §!~~~~BB~ observed that the retention of the CAP was 
fundamental to the stability of a strong Europe, which the United States 
needed, and he did not therefore see the need to call the European agricultural 
system into question. He did, however, support Mr GAUTIER's proposal to confine 
more detailed discussions to the most serious problems. 
Mr EbQB!Q spoke on the implications of the GATT Ministerial meeting and 
emphasized that the US was not satisfied with the results, although they had 
to be seen in the context of the world slump and the increasingly aggressive 
competition on world markets coupled with growing protectionist tendencies. 
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That the market share of obsolete industries, no longer able to compete, 
should decline, was acceptable under certain circumstances. However, a 
situation in which competitive industries - such as the American pharmaceutical 
industry - lost their market share through unfair competition from other countries, 
could not be tolerated and forced the US to retaliate. Consequently, the American 
market should remain closed to Japanese computer firms for as long as American 
firms were denied access to the Japanese market. 
The same applied to the services sector, where US competitiveness was 
being impeded by the trade barriers put up by other countries. The US was 
currently preparing measures to close the American market to those countries 
which were denying American service enterprises access to their markets. For 
as long as no international agreements could be reached in this field, the US 
had no choice but to protect its undertakings with such action and endeavour to 
defend free trade in bilateral negotiations. 
Mr §b!~~~ raised the question of the DISC1Programme which the United 
States had been using to encourage exports for some 15 years. It was his 
understanding that the system was to be dismantled since it was held to be 
incompatible with GATT rules. Was this in fact the case? 
Mr b~~§~ stressed the need to look more closely at the nature of the trade 
flows between the industrialized countries and between the industrialized 
countries and the Third World, to try to ensure that production was better 
matched to requirements. This might prevent production of surpluses for which 
there was no market. 
Mr §~~!!~~ raised the issue of dat~rocessing - a field in which American 
companies had become very active in Europe. There was considerable concern 
about safeguards to ensure that personal details being stored by computer were 
not made available to unauthorized persons. Data-processing was also a good 
example of an industry which was helping to widen the United States trade surplus 
with Europe. Ways had to be found of narrowing the gap. This was not helped 
in many instances by American legislation; there were, for instance, laws 
designed to ensure that the United States government bought mainly American-made 
armaments. 
Mr ~~~~E defended the domestic content legislation. Certainly it had been 
passed because an increasing number of constituents were being put out of work. 
1 Domestic International Sales Corporations. 
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As long as countries like Japan were not open to foreign trade, many Congressmen 
would feel that they had to vote for measures like the Domestic Content Bill. 
He pointed out that restrictions in Community countries on Japanese imports of 
cars were very similar in intention to the Domestic Content Bill. Mr PEASE 
added that he certainly could not equate free trade with free speech. 
Mr ~Q~~~ said that as far .as the United States was concerned future 
patterns of trade would depend very much on what happened durin~ the next 
two years. During this period it should become clear whether the United States 
would in fact become more protectionist or not. 
Mr EB5~~5b said the United States would prefer to preserve the Disc System. 
If that was not possible something would be found that did conform to GATT rules. 
In reply to Mr WELSH, he said that it was not true that at the GATT talks the 
Americans had been much more intent on taking issue with the Community rather 
than the Japanese. 
Mr g~-1~-§~8~~ maintained that problems ~ere often approached on the basis 
of impressions and in the absence of genuine in-depth knowledge. American 
agricultural policy aimed to develop trade flows in both directions and this 
could only be achieved with realistic prices. for instance, a system of 
importation periods was used for certain products in order to afford protection 
at the production stage. He gave the example of melons, on which a 35X customs 
duty was levied during the harvest in California, but for which importation-
normally from Mexico - was duty-free for a large part of the year. 
American agriculture could benefit from export credits which were dictated 
principally by humanitarian or strategic considerations • 
Mr !~Q~~~ declared that the situation for American farmers had now become 
intolerable. They wanted total freedom of trade, but that did not exist at 
the present time. They were therefore calling on the American Government to 
take the firmest possible line. Furthermore, the discussions within GATT had 
shown that the European Community was isolated and that a majority of the other 
countries supported the American way of thinking. 
Mr !~Q~~~ said that the American Government was ready to take up the 
challenge, as illustrated by the conclusion of an agreement with Egypt for the 
supply of one million tons of wheat flour with a refund on exportation. 
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Mr !tlQ~~§ pointed out that the European approach of separate discussions 
for each product could be of value only in the short term. In reality, certain 
European products were permanently in surplus, and it was therefore necessary 
to review the common agricultural policy as a whole. 
~r-2!5~5Bb!~§ said he expected direct content legislation to be 
reintroduced in Congress and it was very likely it would be passed. The 
legislation could be on the statute book in little more than a year. 
~r-I~Q~~§ agreed that it was very likely that Domestic Content legislation 
would go through. 
~£-Y2Q-~Q§~~ said that in that case the Americans must expect some 
reaction from Europe, which would probably mean a campaign to buy European. 
That would not really be the way forward. It should be pointed out to 
Americans that a very large number of jobs depend on exports to the Community. 
Those jobs would be at risk. 
~r_§!~~Q~§ also agreed that the Domestic Content Bill was not dead and 
might be reintroduced. It should be recalled, however, that the bill, as 
passed, was amended and thereby substantially weakened. 
~r-~QY52 returned to the question of arms control. He did not want 
his views to be seen as straightforward anti-Americanism. It was simply 
that many people in Europe questioned the wisdom of the United States' 
nuclear policy. Confusion had also been caused in Europe by the dismissal 
of Mr ROSTOW as Head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Why 
exactly had he been sacked? Did this represent a new shift to the right 
in American policy? Could it perhaps be that Mr ROSTOW actually started 
to negotiate, to talk seriously about arms control? Mr BOYES was also 
concerned about the role that Senator Jesse HELMS was said to have played 
in Mr ROSTOW's dismissal. 
With regard to the "zero option", Mr BOYES said many in Europe did 
not like the apparent inflexibility of this policy? It seemed that even 
the United States' chief negotiator, Mr NITZE, wanted to relax the "zero 
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option". It was clear· why many Europeans were opposed to the deployment 
of cruise missiles. They simply feared the concept of a limited European 
war. And Secretary of State SCHULTZ had not been prepared to confirm 
that they would be under anything other than sole US control. Deployment 
of the Pershing II would contribute further to lowering the European 
nuclear threshold. 
~£-~~~!Q§ said he had been a supporter of a nuclear freeze. And 
the current US Administration was commited to disarmament. But you did 
not open negotiations by putting your final offer on the table. He 
hoped that progress in this field would be made after the forthcoming 
German election. 
~£~-~s!~ said she could not agree with Mr BOYES - particularly his 
outright rejection of the "zero option". His position smacked too much 
of anti-Americanism and did not represent a consensus view in Europe. 
Clearly Europe wished to influence American policy in this field, but 
this could best be achieved by dialogue rather than confrontation. 
~r-~!e~_Q!_~s~~~ also disagreed with Mr BOYES. And he pointed out 
that the Italian government was backing the "zero option" and would continue 
to work together with its other partners in the Western Alliance towards 
seeking solutions on disarmament issues. 
~£-~!§~s~ said that everyone was concerned about the nuclear threat. 
But it had to be recognised that the threat came not from US arms but 
from Russian arms. The Russians did not want nuclear war either. They 
recognised the need for a balance of power. But they were expansionists 
and they might be prepared to use nuclear blackmail. We should not put 
ourselves in a position where we could be blackmailed. This would only 
encourage the Russians to go to the brink to try to force us to capitulate. 
He recalled the example of Hitler and Czechoslovakia. 
In reply to a question from ~£~-§~sQ~b, ~£-~!~~ said that the 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House was satisfied with 
the working arrangements in this int~rparliamentary link. He did not 
recognise the 'Schaetzel-Hackett' initiative as formal, to which 
~r_§!~~Q~~ added that he hoped funds might be found so that when the 
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European Parliament delegation visited the United States, meetings between 
delegations could be arranged outside Washington. He felt this would 
solve the immediate problem. He welcomed Mrs GREDAL's direct approach to 
~r-~~~bQ£~!· 
~r-~by~g~fgbQ recalled the importance of continuing contacts between 
the us Congress and the European Parliament between meetings of delegations 
on matters that could not be fully covered during delegation meetings. 
~r-~!f~bg hoped that Mr BLUMENFELD's suggestion for a US-European 
Community initiative to coordinate interest rates could be clarified. 
~r~_§BgQ~b hoped that a working group could be set up within each 
delegation (two members from each side) to make concrete proposals, a 
suggestion welcomed conditionally by ~r_b~~§g who assured members that 
he would help to attempt to find resources for such practical initiatives. 
He recalled the misunderstandings that arose when the Schaetzel-Hackett 
initiative was first set up. 
~r~-~g!b underlined how the European Parliament delegation represented 
the political groups within the Parliament proportionate to their size. 
Almost all European Community nationalities were represented also. She 
warned the Members of the US Congress delegation against assuming that 
a Group Chairman was the unique representative of that group, since each 
group covered a wide range of parties and nationalities. 
Mr GLINNE, who participated in both delegation and Schaetzel meetings, 
---------
regretted that the other Chairmen of groups did not attend this exchange. 
In his view, all occasions should be seized to inform each other of EC-US 
relations. The Chairman of Groups' meeting (Schaetzel-Hackett initiative) 
was strictly informal. The next meeting was due over the weekend in 
Brussels. 
Over one million tourist visas had been issued for UK citizens visiting 
the US in 1982, and a further one million for citizens in Western Europe, 
bQ£Q_~g!~gbb reported, in his introduction. US citizens visiting Western 
Europe had no need for such tourist visas. Following an initiative supported 
by the European Parliament delegation, efforts had been made to invite the 
US to offer Western Europe reciprocity on this matter. A European Parliament 
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resolution had been supported by a majority of all MEP's; the EC Foreign 
Ministers had made a joint approach to the US Administration in November 
1982. The US bill that was discussed in the 97th Congress was a step 
towards offering visa reciprocity, but the bill failed, not because of 
that aspect. He called for a joint approach from both delegations on 
this matter. 
~r_§~!~~Bb!~§ noted that both House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
had approved a limited programme of non-visa entry to the US. Congress 
had not passed it because of other aspects of the bill. The US Administration 
supported such change and he hoped that the 98th Congress would pass it, 
although he drew attention to the limited nature of the waiver in terms of 
countries covered and period of the visit. 
~£-ItlQ~~§ added that procedures to ensure an adequate system were 
being examined and that with the forthcoming 1984 Olympics in mind, he 
was confident that the Congress would make all efforts to pass such a 
bill. 
Mr GIBBONS recalled the positive role that Congressman ROSENTHAL had 
---------
played in the establishment of the interparliamentary link. He expressed 
his personal sorrow at Congressman Rosenthal's death. He praised his 
support for human rights protection worldwide, for free trade and for 
disarmament and peace, ideas he had continued to support in the Congress 
throughout his last illness. 
~r~_§B~Q~b echoed his feelings. She had transmitted deep condolences 
on behalf of the European Parliament delegation to Mr ZABLOCKI. She 
expressed the great sadness that the delegation felt at this loss. 
The two delegations then observed a short period of silence. 
In winding up the meeting, Mrs GREDAL read out a message from the 
European Parliament President DANKERT: 
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"Please accept my sincere apologies that I am unable to 
join you in your deliberations. Your meetings are very 
timely. During the past year relations between the United 
States and the European Community have been marked by a 
series of disputes in which important interests are at 
stake for both sides. The resolution of these disputes 
will require a considerable degree of mutual patience 
and understanding. It is essential that both sides 
demonstrate a greater appreciation of each others problem& 
and preoccupations. This basis of understanding can only 
be forged through dialogue and communication, particularly 
among the legislators on either side of the Atlantic. The 
biannual meetings between representatives of the us Congress 
and those of the European Parliament provide an invaluable 
mechanism in which greater understanding can be forged. 
Only through a full and frank exchange of views will we 
ensure the mutual confidence and respect that is 
essential to the future health of our relationshid'~ 
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